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11 Introduction
Separating the titles of CEO and Chairman of the Board has received much attention since recent
corporate scandals. Proponents of separating the titles argue that the separation will improve the
board’s governance and reduce the risk of CEO fraud.1 On the other hand, opponents argue that
splitting the titles can create two power bases which could lead to competition and turf-battles2,
and that the independence of the board can be accomplished in other less costly ways.3 Empirical
evidence is inconclusive as well. For example, Rechner and Dalton (1991) and Pi and Timme
(1993) ﬁnd that splitting the titles leads to better ﬁnancial performance, but Baliga et al. (1996)
and Brickley et al. (1997) ﬁnd no such evidence.
Despite this debate, the vast majority of public ﬁrms in US do not separate the titles. Grinstein
and Valles (2008) shows that 30% of ﬁrms in the S&P 1500 index separated the titles in 2004.
But, if we exclude non-independent chairman (e.g. former CEO), less than 10% of ﬁrms have an
independent non-executive chairman of the board (see also Brickley et al. 1997). Then, before
criticizing the CEOs holding the title of chairman, as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argues, it is
important to understand the market forces that have led to the non-separation of the titles as an
apparent market equilibrium. The current system may be the market solution to the corporate
leadership structure. Yet, the previous literature has largely focused on empirical analyses, and
there exist few theoretical studies on the equilibrium corporate leadership structure.
This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap by providing a simple model of leadership and authority. We
assume Stackelberg leadership as the primary role of the chairman. One of the main responsibilities
of the chairman of the board is to control the ﬂow of information to the board and set the agenda.
Thus, if a CEO holds both titles, s/he can take leadership by proposing his/her favorite projects
before the board meeting. Then, the board would approve them unless it ﬁnds fraud or can propose
1For example, see Jensen (1993), Garten (2002), or Felton (2004b).
2For example, see Lorsch and Lipton (1993), or Condit and Hess (2003).
3See, for example, Brickley et al. (1997), or Knowledge@Wharton (June 2, 2004) "Splitting Up the Roles of CEO
and Chairman: Reform or Red Herring?"
2better alternative projects.4 On the other hand, by separating the titles, the board can eﬀectively
take the leadership by setting its own agenda before the CEO make the proposals.
Regardless of the leadership structure, the board has the formal decision rights to ratify and
to monitor the implementation of resource commitments. Thus, even if a CEO holds both titles,
if the board has a better proposal or ﬁnds evidence of fraud in the CEO’s project, the board can
reject the CEO’s project and implement its own. That is, the board always has the ﬁnal decision
right, or formal authority following Aghion and Tirole (1997).
From this perspective, we regard combining the titles of CEO and chairman as CEO-leadership5
or delegation of leadership. Similarly, we regard the separation of the titles as board-leadership, or
non-delegation of leadership. Then, this paper focuses on whether and when it is optimal for the
board to delegate the leadership.
We show that the optimal leadership structure varies depending on the board’s independence
level. If the board is independent (as will be deﬁned precisely later), CEO leadership, where a CEO
holds the title of the chairman, is optimal. In other words, if the board is already independent,
separating the titles can do more harm than good to the shareholders/board. However, if the
board is not independent, board leadership, or the separation of the titles, is optimal. These
results support and reconcile the opposing views on the separation of the titles as discussed in the
beginning, and show that board independence is the key to leadership reform.
Then, we allow the shareholders/board to choose the board’s independence level, and the CEO
to decide whether to invest with the interest of the shareholders in mind or to pursue his/her own
private beneﬁt (e.g. fraud). Endogenizing the board’s independence level and the CEO project
type leads to a unique equilibrium, where the board chooses the maximum level of independence
without separating the titles of CEO and chairman. In this equilibrium, the CEO decides to invest
in the interest of the shareholders. This result can explain why most US ﬁrms do not split the titles,
and show that the current market solution to the corporate leadership structure may be eﬃcient
despite the apparent concerns. Furthermore, we show that this equilibrium is robust even if the
4"Immediately before every board meeting I receive 1 to 2 inches of material to prepare me for the meeting. The
information is diﬀerent every time .... I know the insight I need to be eﬀective is in there somewhere, but I have a
tough time extracting it and tracking it over time." - a survey respondent
- from Felton (2004a), "What directors and investors want from governance reform."
5In the literature, combining the titles is also referred as ‘unitary leadership’ or ‘CEO duality’.
3separation of the titles leads to no-leadership.
When the separation of the titles is optimal for the board/shareholders, CEO resistance is
often considered as the main impediment. Yet, we have little understanding of when and how a
CEO would resist separation of the titles. Thus, this paper also analyzes the CEO’s preference of
leadership structure, and characterizes the leadership structure that can satisfy both the CEO and
the board. Somewhat surprisingly, the unique equilibrium characterized above is robust even when
the board and the CEO jointly decide the optimal leadership structure.
As far as we know, this paper presents the ﬁrst theoretical analysis of the separation of the
titles of CEO and chairman of the board, especially with endogenous board independence and CEO
project type. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) considers endogenous board independence, but does
not analyze leadership structure or separation of the titles. Maggi (1996) and Damme and Hurkens
(2002) analyze endogenous (Stackelberg) leadership in the context of product market competition
in a given strategic relationship. However, they don’t study the role of authority. Moreover, they
study neither how the optimal leadership changes in diﬀerent strategic interactions nor how the
strategic interaction can be chosen endogenously.
It is important to note that the roles of the chairman are complex and diﬀer across companies,
and that our model does not capture other roles of the chairman, such as evaluation of board
members, communication with shareholders, etc. Also, leadership is a general and ambiguous
concept. Thus, Stackelberg leadership in our model, as will be explained in detail in the next
section, does not capture various other aspects of leadership. In this sense, this paper is exploratory.
Although we present the model in the context of separating the titles of CEO and Chairman
of the Board, the model we develop addresses the delegation of leadership and endogenous rela-
tionships within hierarchical organizations in general. While the literature has largely focused on
the delegation of authority (e.g. Aghion and Tirole 1997, Baker et al. 1999), many practices of
bottom-up management or worker empowerment in reality represent the delegation of leadership,
not necessarily the delegation of authority. For example, a ﬁrm may allow workers to propose new
ideas and projects without imposing them from the top, but the top management still has the
ﬁnal authority to overturn those. Therefore, this paper provides a new framework to analyze such
practices. Also most studies on hierarchical relationships, such as principal-agent models, assume
a particular strategic relationship between the two, and do not ask where the relationship comes
4from. This paper shows that a typical governance relationship as can be found in most hierarchical
organizations is also an equilibrium outcome.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we presents a simple model of
authority and leadership. Section 3 characterizes the optimal leadership structure for the board
for given level of independence. Then, in section 4, we endogenize the board’s independence level
and the CEO’s type, and characterize the full equilibrium. Section 5 investigates possible CEO
resistance by analyzing the CEO’s preference for leadership structure, and determine the leadership
structure that can satisfy both the board and the CEO. In section 6, we discuss the robustness of
the equilibrium and more general implications of the model, and conclude in section 7.
2 Model
We consider a three-stage game by the board and a CEO. In the ﬁrst stage, shareholders/board6
determine the degree of board independence, by, for example, changing the number of outside board
members or hiring an independent auditor. The CEO also decides the type of his project, that is,
whether to invest for the interests of the shareholders or pursue his own private beneﬁts, including
through fraud. In the second stage, the board decides whether to separate the titles of CEO and
Chairman of the Board. In the third stage, the board exerts eﬀort on its governance task, and the
CEO exerts eﬀort on his project. Since we will solve the game backwards, we present the details
of each stage in reserve order.
Authority The third stage is essentially the same as Aghion and Tirole (1997). There are two
risk-neutral players: the board7 and a CEO. The CEO exerts eﬀort aC to succeed in his project
that was chosen in the ﬁrst stage. For example, a CEO may search for a target of acquisition or
a new business for expansion, and prepare these agendas for board approval. The probability that
the CEO will succeed in the project is aC where 0 < aC < 1. Thus, the harder the CEO works, the
more likely the CEO is to succeed in his own project.
6Throughout the paper, we assume that the board reﬂects the shareholders’ interests, and ignore the possible
agency problem between the board members and the shareholders. Relaxing this assumption would be an interesting
topic for future research.
7Throughout the paper, we treat the board as a single player.
5The board exerts its governance eﬀort aB to detect and ratify any potential fraud by the CEO
or to develop an alternative project. The probability of detection (or developing an alternative
project) is aB where 0 < aB < 1. If the board successfully detects any fraud (or develops an
alternative project), it implements its own project regardless of the outcome of the CEO’s project.
In such a case, the board receives Π (> 0) and the CEO receives v (< Π). However, if the board
fails to detect any fraud and if the CEO succeeds in his project, the board will implement the
CEO’s project. Then, the CEO receives V (> 0), and the board receives π (< V ).
In other words, following Aghion and Tirole (1997), the board has the formal authority. Note
that if the board does not detect any fraud or develop its own agenda, the board has no choice
but to approve the CEO’s project even when π < 0. In other words, the principal does not have
veto power. If, however, the principal has veto power, we can restrict attention to the cases where
π > 0, and the qualitative results of the paper do not change.
We normalize Π and V to one. Then, the expected utilities of the board (denoted by EUB) and
CEO (denoted by EUC) are given as follows:












i is the cost of eﬀort by each player (i = B,C). We also assume k > 2 to ensure that
the eﬀorts (= probability of success) in the equilibrium remain between zero and one8.
Leadership and the Chairman In the second stage, the board (or shareholders) decides who
can commit to the eﬀort level ﬁrst. Later, we will also consider a case where both the board and the
CEO jointly decide the leadership structure. We assume that the chairman of the board represents
the (Stackelberg) leadership. That is, if the CEO doubles as chairman, the CEO takes on the
leadership and exerts (or commits) his executive eﬀort before the board chooses its governance
eﬀort. For example, the CEO can commit the resources to develop his/her own private agenda
such as acquisition and expansion before the board starts thinking about its own agenda or before
the board schedules its own governance eﬀort, such as a non-executive board meeting. Throughout
the paper, we will use ‘non-separation of titles’ and ‘CEO leadership’ interchangeably.
8This model does not consider (performance-based) wage contracts. The role of such a contract would be another
interesting topic for future research.
6However, if the board has a non-executive chairman, the board has the leadership and commits
to its governance eﬀort before the CEO chooses his eﬀort level. For example, the board can
commit its resources through a non-executive board meeting. Throughout the paper, unless noted
otherwise, we will use ‘separation of the titles’ and ‘board leadership’ interchangeably.
Opponents of splitting the titles argue, however, separation of the titles can lead to confusion
and no clear leadership. Therefore, we will consider three possible leadership structures: CEO-
leadership, board-leadership, and no-leadership.
Note that when the CEO is also the chairman, he may have the leadership, but the board always
has the formal authority. Therefore, combining the titles of CEO and chairman can be considered
as the delegation of leadership. Unlike Aghion and Tirole (1997), we do not focus on the delegation
of formal authority9. Instead, this paper concerns the delegation of leadership.
Leadership does not necessarily lead to more eﬀort. When a player takes the leadership and
increases his eﬀort, we refer to such leadership as active leadership. If a player takes the leadership
and reduces his eﬀort, we refer to such leadership as passive leadership.
Board Independence In the ﬁrst stage, the shareholders determine the degree of board inde-
pendence (v), and the CEO selects the type of his project (π). If the board is independent of the
CEO, it would be able to impose a larger punishment upon the detection of fraud. Also, the board’s
alternative project can be substantially diﬀerent from the CEO’s favorite project. Therefore, if the
board is independent of the CEO, we expect that v will be smaller. Recall that v is the CEO’s
payoﬀ when the board’s project succeeds and gets implemented. On the other hand, if the board
is not independent or if the board’s main role is to assist the CEO, we expect v to be larger. Thus,
we interpret v as the degree of the board’s (in)dependence.
In particular, from (2), if v < aC, the board’s eﬀort will decrease the CEO’s expected utility,
i.e. ∂EUC
∂aB < 0 if v < aC. Thus, in an equilibrium, we deﬁne the board as independent if v < aC,
and dependent if v > aC. An alternative interpretation is that if v < aC, the board is primarily
engaged in monitoring and auditing the CEO. If v > aC, then the board is primarily assisting the
CEO.
It is important to note that from (1) and (2), the level of board independence (v) does not
9For example, Baker, et al. (1999) argues that the formal authority cannot be credibly delegated to the CEO.
7aﬀect the board’s payoﬀ directly, but may change the CEO’s behavior. That is, this paper focuses
on the strategic value of the board’s independence.
If the CEO pursues his own private beneﬁt (e.g. empire building) or fraud, the implementation
of the CEO’s project can reduce the board’s payoﬀs, or π < 0. However, if the CEO invests in the
interest of the shareholders, we expect π > 0. Therefore, we consider π as a measure of the CEO’s
or project’s type. Again note that from (1) and (2), the CEO’s project type has no direct eﬀect on
the CEO’s own payoﬀs.
In general, the choice of π and v determines the (strategic) relationship between the board and
the CEO. Note that most previous studies have assumed the relationship between a principal and
an agent to be exogenously given. For example, in most principal-agent models, the agent’s success
leads to larger proﬁts of the principal (i.e. π > 0). Also, in Aghion and Tirole (1997), both π and
v are assumed to be positive. In contrast, we endogenize the strategic relationship.
We summarize the timing of the game in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here]
3 Optimal Leadership Structure: Separating the Titles of Chair-
man and CEO
In this section, we ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium choice of eﬀorts. Then, we analyze the optimal
leadership structure that maximizes the board’s expected payoﬀs for each given level of board
independence (v) and CEO’s project type (π). Even though we will endogenize v and π later, this
section can be interesting by itself when the level of board independence and CEO’s project type
are exogenously given.
For a benchmark, consider a case with no-leadership where the board and the CEO simulta-
neously choose their eﬀort levels. From (1) and (2), the board’s and the CEO’s best response








(1 − aB) (4)
8Note that the slope of the board’s best response is determined by the type of CEO project, π.
If π > 0, for example, the board’s best response function is downward sloping. In other words,
if the CEO is engaged in a proﬁtable investment project, the more the CEO works, the less need
for the board’s eﬀort exists. However, if the CEO is pursuing his private beneﬁts or engaged in a
fraudulent project (π < 0), the more the CEO works, the harder the board has to work to prevent
the CEO’s project.
In contrast, the slope of the CEO’s best response is always negative, and does not depend on
the board’s (in)dependence, or v. It is because the CEO receives v only when the board succeeds,
over which the CEO has no control due to the lack of formal authority. As we will show below,
this asymmetry plays an important role in the following analyses.
Let us denote the no-leadership equilibrium eﬀorts by the board and the CEO by aNL
B and aNL
C ,










3.1 Independent Board and Fraudulent CEO (v < aNL
C and π < 0)
One of the key issues in the debate on splitting the titles of the CEO and the chairman is whether
the split is necessary when the board is already independent.
“In years to come, the issue of dividing the CEO and chairperson’s roles may take on less
importance as boards of directors adopt other ways of strengthening their independence to give
them the ability to go head to head with hard-driving CEOs..."
- from "Splitting Up the Roles of CEO and Chairman: Reform or Red Herring? " Knowl-
edge@Wharton (June 2, 2004)
However, many argue that if the CEO is also a chairman, the board cannot provide proper
oversight on CEO activities, and this may lead to potential fraud. So we ﬁrst study the optimal
leadership structure when the board is independent (i.e. v < aNL
C ) and the CEO is engaged in a
fraudulent project (π < 0).
From (4), the CEO’s best response function is downward sloping. Therefore, if the board takes
the leadership, it would want to increase its (monitoring) eﬀort level to discourage the CEO’s eﬀort.
9However, from (3), if π < 0, the board’s best response function is upward sloping. Therefore,
if the CEO takes the leadership, the CEO would want to decrease its eﬀort level in order not to
provoke the board’s (monitoring) eﬀort. In fact, if v is small enough, the CEO will reduce his eﬀort
enough so that CEO (passive) leadership can be more desirable to the board than board (active)
leadership. We can formalize this intuition as follows:
Proposition 1 Suppose that v < aNL
C and π < 0.
(i) If v ≤ θ, then passive CEO leadership is optimal.
(ii) If θ < v < aNL
C , then active board leadership is optimal.
(iii) Either form of leadership is always better than no-leadership












In other words, even when the CEO is engaged in a fraudulent project, if the board is inde-
pendent enough, providing leadership to the CEO by combining the titles of CEO and chairman
is optimal. This result is consistent with the arguments made by the opponents to splitting the
titles. Intuitively, if the board has the leadership, in order to reduce the CEO’s eﬀort, the board
will have to exert lots of monitoring eﬀort. However, if the CEO has the leadership and if the board
is independent enough, the CEO would reduce his eﬀort voluntarily in order not to provoke the
board’s governance eﬀort. That is, the board can reduce the CEO’s fraud eﬀort while exerting less
governance eﬀort under CEO-leadership than under board-leadership.
3.2 Independent Board and Cooperative CEO (v < aNL
C and π > 0)
Now suppose that the board is independent (v < aNL
C ), and that the CEO is investing for the
interests of the board/shareholders (π > 0). Then, the board wants to encourage the CEO’s eﬀort,
while the CEO wants to reduce the board’s governance eﬀort. This relationship is possibly the
most common one in many ﬁrms and hierarchical relationship.
Recall that the CEO’s best response function is always downward sloping. Therefore, if the
board takes the leadership, it will reduce its (monitoring) eﬀort in order to encourage more (invest-
ment) eﬀort from the CEO.
10Since π > 0, the board’s best response function is also downward sloping. Therefore if the CEO
takes the leadership, he will increase his (investment) eﬀort in order to give comfort to the board
and reduce the board’s (monitoring) eﬀort. In fact, if v is small enough, the CEO will increase his
investment eﬀort enough so that CEO leadership can be better for the board than board leadership.
We can formalize this intuition as follows:
Proposition 2 Suppose that v < aNL
C and π > 0.
(i) If v ≤ θ, then active CEO leadership is optimal.
(ii) If θ < v < aNL
C , then passive board leadership is optimal.
(iii) Some form of leadership is always better than no-leadership












From proposition 1 and 2, note that regardless of the type of CEO project (π), the optimal
leadership structure is identical if the board is independent (v < aNL
C ), even though the style of
optimal leadership (active vs. passive) is diﬀerent. Also, note that no-leadership is the worst
outcome. In other words, if separating the titles leads to no-leadership, then non-separation of the
titles (i.e. CEO-leadership) would be always optimal. This result is consistent with the arguments
made by the opponents of the separation of the titles.
"The creation of a non-executive chairman would signify a new power base in a corporation
which theoretically could create competition and turf battles between a CEO and a chairman."
- Condit and Hess (2003)
3.3 Dependent Board and Cooperative CEO (v > aNL
C and π > 0)
Now suppose that the board is dependent (v > aNL
C ). Thus, it cannot severely punish the CEO
even when it detects the fraud. Also, the board’s own idea is similar to the CEO’s favorite project.
Then, v would be large, and the CEO’s utility can increase in the board’s eﬀort. Also, suppose
that the CEO invests for the beneﬁt of the board/shareholders (π > 0).
While this type of cooperative relationship sounds ideal, it has a well-known free-rider problem.
That is, if the board takes the leadership, it will reduce its eﬀort to motivate more CEO eﬀort.
11Likewise, if the CEO takes the leadership, he will also reduce his eﬀort level to encourage more
eﬀort from the board. Then, from the board’s perspective, board leadership is optimal.
Proposition 3 Suppose that v > aNL
C and π > 0.
(i) Passive board leadership is always optimal.
(ii) No-leadership is better than CEO leadership.
Proof. See appendix.
Now the board prefers the passive board leadership because the CEO will have a greater chance
to implement his own project, and work harder. Such passive leadership can take the form of
‘minimal management intervention’ or ‘small government’ in practice.
Note that unlike previous cases, if the board is dependent, CEO leadership is worse than no-
leadership now, because CEO leadership allows the CEO to commit to shirking, leaving no choice
to the board but to work by itself.
3.4 Dependent Board and Fraudulent CEO (v > aNL
C and π < 0)
Now suppose that the CEO is engaged in potential fraud or is pursuing private beneﬁts that would
lower the board’s payoﬀs (π < 0), while the board is dependent and cooperative with the CEO
(v > aNL
C ).
In this case, the board works for the CEO’s interests, but still wants to reduce the CEO’s
fraudulent eﬀort. Thus, if the board takes the leadership, it would increase its cooperative eﬀort
in order to discourage the CEO’s fraudulent eﬀort.
Since π < 0, the board’s best response function is upward sloping. Therefore, if the CEO takes
the leadership, he will increase his fraudulent eﬀort as a threat to induce more cooperative eﬀort
from the board, which is the opposite of what the board wants. Therefore, (active) board leadership
is always optimal.
Proposition 4 Suppose that v > aNL
C and π < 0.
(i) Active board leadership is always optimal.
(ii) No-leadership is better than CEO leadership.
12Proof. See appendix.
From propositions 3 and 4, if the board is dependent, the CEO would exert the least investment
eﬀort or the most fraudulent eﬀect when he has the leadership. Therefore, board leadership (or
the separation of the titles) is optimal regardless of the CEO project’s type if the board is not
independent (v > θ).
Moreover, from propositions 3 and 4, even when the separation of the titles leads to no-leadership
(instead of board-leadership) as some fear, the qualitative results do not change.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the separation of the titles of CEO and chairman leads to no
leadership. Then, it is optimal to separate the titles if and only if v > aNL
C .
4 Endogenous Relationship
So far we have assumed that the type of relationship, that is, the board (in)dependence (v) and
the CEO project’s type (π) are exogenously given. In this section, we allow the board to choose
its level of independence (v) and the CEO to decide the type of his project (π). More speciﬁcally,
the board can choose v ∈ [v,v] where 0 < v < 1 and −v < v < θ. At the same time, the CEO
can choose π ∈ [π,π] where10 0 < π < 1 and −π < π < π. As shown below, the equilibrium does
not change even if the board (or the CEO) can commit to its independence (or project type) ﬁrst.
Therefore, we don’t discuss the Stackelberg leadership in this ﬁrst stage of the game.
As a reference point, let us denote the CEO’s equilibrium eﬀort under board leadership when
π = π by aBL+
C . Then, we can characterize the CEO’s best response as follows:
Proposition 5 There exists γ (θ < γ < aBL+
C ) such that
(i) if v ≤ γ, then it is optimal for the CEO to choose the most cooperative project, π = π.
(ii) if v > γ, then it is optimal for the CEO to choose the least cooperative project, π = π.
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, suppose that the board is independent enough (v < θ). Then, from proposition 1
and 2, the board will choose CEO-leadership regardless of π. Recall that if the board is independent
10Recall that if the board has the veto power, we can restrict π to be positive.
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can reduce the board’s eﬀort by investing in a more cooperative project. Therefore, the optimal
type of project for the CEO is the most cooperative one, π = π.
Now suppose that the board is dependent or cooperative enough (v > aBL+
C ). From propositions
3 and 4, the board will choose board leadership. Recall that since the board is cooperative, the
CEO wishes to increase the board’s eﬀort. From proposition 3, if π > 0, the board will take the
leadership and decrease its eﬀort, while if π < 0, the board will take the leadership to increase its
eﬀort. Therefore, we can show that the board’s eﬀort decreases in π. In other words, to increase
the board’s eﬀort, the CEO must choose the minimum π, or the least cooperative project. From
continuity, there exists γ (θ < γ < aBL+
C ) such that if v = γ, the CEO is indiﬀerent between π = π
and π = π.11
For the board, it turns out that it has a dominant strategy.
Proposition 6 Regardless of π, it is always optimal for the board to choose v = v.
Proof. See appendix.
In other words, the board always wants to choose the maximum independence. This result is
not trivial because from (1) and (2), the board’s independence (v) has only strategic value, not
direct beneﬁt, to the board. Intuitively, if the board is dependent, from propositions 3 and 4, the
board will choose board-leadership. Since the CEO’s best response function does not depend on
v, however, it is straightforward to show that the board’s payoﬀ under board-leadership does not
depend on v.
Now suppose that the board is independent enough. Then, from propositions 1 and 2, CEO
leadership is optimal. If π > 0, as v gets smaller and smaller, the CEO will increase his (cooperative)
eﬀort in order to reduce the board’s (monitoring) eﬀort. That is, the board’s payoﬀ decreases with
v. If π < 0, as v gets smaller and smaller, the CEO will decrease his (fraud) eﬀort in order not to
11In our simple model, the CEO’s optimal strategy is a corner solution. It is partly because we have ﬁxed the
payoﬀs from implementing one’s own project (V and Π) to one. If changing v or π implies the changes in V or Π as
well, the optimal strategy can be an interior solution.
14provoke the board’s (monitoring) eﬀort. Therefore, the board’s payoﬀ decreases with v again. In
other words, regardless of π, the board’s payoﬀ decreases in v, or increases with its independence.
Then, ﬁnally, we can characterize the equilibrium of the whole game as follows:
Proposition 7 There exists a unique equilibrium characterized by (active) CEO-leadership (i.e.
combining the titles of CEO and chairman) with the maximum board independence (v = v) and
CEO compliance (π = π).
Proof. The proof follows from the previous propositions.
An important implication of this result is that board independence should be a priority over
‘splitting the titles of CEO and chairman’. From Proposition 1, when the board is not independent
(i.e. when v > θ), board-leadership (i.e. splitting the titles) is indeed optimal. However, Proposition
6 shows that the board can do better by lowering v. Since CEO-leadership is optimal when v is
small (i.e. v < θ), this implies that the board can do better by increasing board independence (i.e.
by lowering v) without ‘splitting the titles’.
As we show below, this equilibrium is robust even when the optimal leadership structure in the
second stage must satisfy both the board and the CEO or when the separation of the titles leads
to no-leadership. Also note that because the board has a dominant strategy, the equilibrium does
not change even if the board (or the CEO) can commit to v (or π) ﬁrst.
This result can explain why most US ﬁrms do not split the titles. Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998) says;
"... it is easy to forget that the current system is, nonetheless, the market solution to an
organizational design problem."
Indeed, this paper shows that the current market solution to the corporate leadership structure
may be eﬃcient despite the apparent concerns. For example, if the board is already independent
enough, splitting the titles can do more harm to the shareholders than good.
Perhaps more importantly, proposition 7 shows that the relationship between the board and the
CEO in the unique equilibrium can be characterized as a common governance relationship. That
is, the board chooses a task that will reduce the CEO’s payoﬀs (e.g. monitoring or auditing), while
the CEO chooses a task that will increase the board’s payoﬀs (e.g. proﬁtable investment). While
15most literature (e.g. principal-agent models) takes such a relationship as given, our results show
that it is also an equilibrium outcome. We discuss this implication in more details in section 5.
Despite Proposition 7, some ﬁrms may have to split the two titles in order to reduce v (or
improve independence). Recall that in our model, the board can choose any level of independence
in the ﬁrst stage. However, in reality, when the CEO has the leadership role already, the board
may not be able to reduce v, especially not below θ. In such a case, the board would want to split
the titles ﬁrst in order to reduce v. After that, the board will be better oﬀ by combining the titles
again. This might explain why some ﬁrms have spit the titles only to combine them later. For
example, GM, Allegheny Technologies, and Kennametal have all split the two titles, then combined
them again later.
5 CEO Resistance
So far, we have analyzed the optimal leadership structure from the board’s perspective. In reality,
however, CEOs have a strong inﬂuence on leadership reform. For example, a survey shows that
investors and directors expect CEOs to be most resistant to leadership changes (Felton 2004a).
Despite the potential importance of a CEO’s role in leadership reform, we have little understand-
ing of when and how a CEO would resist leadership changes, such as the separation of the titles.
Thus, we analyze the CEO’s preference over the diﬀerent leadership structures, and characterize
the leadership structure that can satisfy both the board and the CEO.
5.1 CEO Preference for Leadership
First, suppose that the CEO is pursuing his own private beneﬁts or engaged in a fraudulent project
(i.e. π < 0), and consider the CEO’s preference for leadership structure depending on the board’s
(in)dependence level (v).
If v is suﬃciently small, the CEO would like to reduce the board’s monitoring eﬀort. From
proposition 1, however, board leadership is active (i.e. increases the board’s eﬀort). Therefore, the
CEO would prefer CEO-leadership to board-leadership. On the other hand, recall that the CEO’s
utility can increase in the board’s eﬀort if aC < v. Thus, if board-leadership induces a suﬃciently
lower aC, the CEO may prefer board leadership to no-leadership or even to CEO-leadership.
16If v is large enough, the CEO would like to increase the board’s eﬀort. From proposition 4,
board-leadership leads to larger eﬀort by the board, aB. Thus, the CEO may prefer board-leadership
to CEO-leadership. However, if v is too large, board-leadership may not induce large enough aB.
So the CEO would prefer to take the leadership and induce a larger aB.
For simplicity, let us denote board leadership by BL, CEO leadership by CL, and no-leadership
by NL. Also denote the CEO’s preference over diﬀerent leadership structures by ￿C . Then, we
can formalize these intuitions as follows.
Proposition 8 Suppose that π < 0. There exist φ, γ, and γ￿ such that 0 < θ < φ < γ < aNL
C < γ￿,
and that
(i) if v < φ, then CL ￿C NL ￿C BL.
(ii) if φ < v < γ, then CL ￿C BL ￿C NL.
(iii) if γ < v < γ￿, then BL ￿C CL ￿C NL.
(iv) if v > γ￿, then CL ￿C BL ￿C NL.
Proof. See appendix.
It is interesting to note that the CEO may prefer board-leadership to CEO-leadership for an
intermediate value of v. That is, when the board is neither independent nor cooperative, the CEO
prefers the separation of the titles. Intuitively, if v ≈ aNL
C , the board’s eﬀort level does not aﬀect
the CEO’s utility much at the no-leadership equilibrium. Thus, the CEO does not gain much from
CEO leadership. Interestingly, however, the board-leadership will force the CEO to reduce his eﬀort
(= lower probability of success) by increasing the board’s monitoring eﬀort. With a low probability
of his own success, the CEO would now prefer the greater board eﬀort which board-leadership
brings. Therefore, the CEO may prefer board-leadership to CEO-leadership.
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 summarizes both the board’s and the CEO’s preference over leadership structures.
Note that the board and the CEO may agree on the optimal leadership structure, as highlighted
by the grey area in Figure 2. In such cases, we wouldn’t need to worry about CEO resistance.
17However, they do not always agree on the optimal leadership structure. In particular, we can
provide the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Suppose that π < 0. The board and the CEO disagree on the optimal leadership
structure if and only if v > γ￿ or θ < v < γ. When they disagree, the board prefers the separation
of the titles (BL) while the CEO prefers non-separation of the titles (CL).
Now suppose that the CEO is investing for the interests of the board (π > 0). If v is large
enough, from proposition 1, compared with the no-leadership equilibrium, the board would like to
reduce its eﬀort to increase the CEO’s eﬀort, but the CEO would like to reduce his eﬀort to increase
the board’s eﬀort. Therefore, as long as the CEO’s utility increases in the board’s eﬀort, the CEO
is likely to prefer CEO-leadership to board-leadership. On the other hand, as noted above, the
CEO’s utility increases in the board’s eﬀort if and only if aC < v. Therefore, even when v is large,
if aC > v, the CEO’s utility will decrease in the board’s eﬀort, and the CEO may prefer board
leadership. The following proposition formalize these intuitions.
Proposition 9 Suppose that π > 0. There exist φ, γ, and γ￿ such that 0 < θ < φ < γ < aNL
C < γ￿,
and such that
(i) If v < γ￿, then CL ￿C BL ￿C NL.
(ii) If γ￿ < v < γ, then BL ￿C CL ￿C NL.
(iii) If γ < v < φ, then CL ￿C BL ￿C NL.
(iv) If v > φ, then CL ￿C NL ￿C BL.
, where γ￿ < 0 and φ > γ > aNL
C .
Proof. See appendix.
In general, the CEO prefers CEO-leadership when the board is dependent. However, when
the board is independent, the CEO prefers board-leadership, with an exception for the case where
v < γ￿ (< 0). Note that from propositions 1 and 2, this is the opposite of the board’s preference. In
particular, if a dependent (or weak) board is trying to take the leadership by splitting the titles of
CEO and chairman, the CEO would resist such a leadership reform even when the CEO is investing
for the beneﬁts of the board/shareholders.
Figure 3 summarizes the board’s and the CEO’s preferences more precisely when π > 0.
18[Figure 3 here].
For an intermediate value of v (where θ < v < γ), both the board and the CEO may ﬁnd
board-leadership optimal. Also, as in the previous case, if the board is independent enough, both
the board and the CEO prefer CEO-leadership. However, in other cases, the board and the CEO
would disagree as follows:
Corollary 3 Suppose that π > 0. The board and the CEO disagree on the optimal leadership
structure if and only if v > γ or γ￿ < v < θ. If the board is independent (where γ￿ < v < θ),
the board prefers non-separation of titles (CL) while the CEO prefers separation of the titles (BL).
If the board is suﬃciently dependent (where v > γ), however, the board prefers separation of the
titles (BL) while the CEO prefers non-separation of the titles (CL).
For successful changes in leadership, it is critical to understand when and how a CEO would
resist the changes. Thus, our results provide important insights into such leadership reform. Corol-
laries 2 and 3 shows that if the board is dependent (or weak), the board will prefer board leadership
(or separation of the titles), while the CEO will prefer CEO leadership, regardless of the type of CEO
project (π). Assuming that it is the dependent boards that are pursuing the leadership changes,
our result explains why CEOs appear to resist the separation of the titles. These results do not
change much even if the separation of titles leads to no leadership, instead of board-leadership.
Corollary 4 Suppose that the separation of the titles leads to no-leadership. If the board is
independent (v < aNL
C ), both the board and the CEO prefer non-separation of the titles. If the
board is dependent (v > aNL
C ), however, the board prefers separation of the titles (BL), while the
CEO prefers non-separation of the titles (CL).
This corollary follows directly from Figures 2 and 3 by ignoring board-leadership as an option.
Note that when the board is dependent (or weak), there will be conﬂicts between the board and
the CEO, which may prevent the separation of the titles.
195.2 Pareto Improving Leadership Change
If CEO resistance is strong enough, changes in leadership is feasible only when it improves the
utility of both the board and the CEO.
"Clearly, they [CEOs] will strongly oppose giving up the power and inﬂuence they have worked
so hard to accumulate. Yet given the growing demand for change, CEOs, directors, and investors
must form a plan that works for everyone." (Felton 2004a)
Assuming that disagreement in the leadership structure will lead to no-leadership, we then may
have to consider only pareto-improving leadership reform with respect to no-leadership. Thus,
in this section, we modify the concept of optimal leadership structure as the one that makes the
most pareto-improvement over no-leadership. For example, if board-leadership pareto-improves no-
leadership, and CEO-leadership pareto-improves board-leadership. Then, we deﬁne CEO leadership
as optimal.
First, suppose that the CEO is pursuing his own private beneﬁts or engaged in a fraudulent
project (i.e. π < 0). From ﬁgure 2, we can provide the following proposition.
Proposition 10 Suppose that π < 0. To make the most pareto-improvement over no-leadership,
(i) if v > γ, board-leadership is optimal.
(ii) if φ < v < γ, both board- and the CEO-leadership are optimal.
(iii) if v < φ, CEO-leadership is optimal.
Proof. Follows from Figure 2.
There are at least three implications that are noteworthy. First, this optimal leadership struc-
ture is qualitatively similar to the one that maximizes the board’s payoﬀ only (see proposition 1
and 4). The only diﬀerence arises when θ < v < φ, where CEO-leadership provides a pareto-
improvement, but the board’s payoﬀ is maximized under board-leadership. Second, no-leadership
is always pareto-dominated by some form of leadership. Thus, when π < 0, clear leadership can
always play a positive role in the organization. Third, when the board is independent enough
(v < φ), only CEO-leadership provides a pareto-improvement over no-leadership.
Now suppose that the CEO is investing for the interests of the board (i.e. π > 0). From Figure
3, we can provide the following proposition.
20Proposition 11 Suppose that π > 0. To make the largest pareto-improvement over no-leadership,
(i) if v > φ, neither leadership structure provides a pareto-improvement over no-leadership.
(ii) if θ < v < φ, board-leadership is optimal.
(iii) if γ￿ < v < θ, both board- and CEO-leadership can be optimal.
(iv) if v < γ￿, CEO-leadership is optimal.
Proof. Follows from Figure 3.
Unlike the case where π < 0, if the board is dependent enough (v > φ), there is no leadership
structure that provides a pareto-improvement over no-leadership. This is because each player wants
to commit to less eﬀort and force the other to exert more eﬀort. In such a case, we can expect that
clear leadership may not arise. Otherwise, the optimal leadership structure is again qualitatively
similar to the one that maximizes the board’s payoﬀ only. For example, if the board is independent
enough, compared with the no-leadership outcome, combining the titles of CEO and the chairman
would satisfy both the board and the CEO.
5.3 Endogenous Relationship
With CEO resistance, suppose that the leadership structure in the second stage will be chosen to
make the largest pareto improvement over no-leadership as in proposition 10 and 11. Now consider
the equilibrium when we endogenize board independence (v) and the CEO’s project type (π) as in
section 3.
When both board- and CEO-leadership are optimal, to break the tie, we assume that if the
board is dependent (v > aNL
C ), the CEO can choose the leadership structure. However, if the board
is independent (v < aNL
C ), the board can choose the leadership structure. Also, if neither leadership
structure pareto-dominates no-leadership, we assume that there will be no-leadership in the second
stage of the game.
Proposition 12 Even with CEO resistance, the equilibrium (as speciﬁcity in proposition 7) does
not change.
Proof. See appendix.
21In other words, the equilibrium in proposition 7, where the board selects the leadership structure,
is robust even when the leadership structure must satisfy both the board and the CEO. It is also
straightforward to show that the equilibrium is robust when the separation of the titles leads to
no-leadership instead of board leadership12. These results again explain why the vast majority of
ﬁrms in the US do not separate the titles.
6 Discussion
6.1 Delegation of Leadership and Bottom-Up Management
In response to the increasingly popular use of bottom-up management or worker-empowerment
movements, the literature has largely focused on the delegation of authority. However, in practice,
the top managers may delegate the (Stackelberg) leadership to their subordinates, but not the
formal authority. In other words, the subordinates may propose and work on new projects for
themselves without being told what to do beforehand, but the top-managers typically have the
ﬁnal decision right to overturn the subordinates’ proposals. Baker et al. (1999), for example,
argues that all subordinates’ decision rights are “loaned, not owned”.
Therefore, the delegation of leadership can be a more realistic concept to analyze bottom-up
management than the delegation of authority. Then, this paper shows that the top management’s
commitment to strict governance (i.e. being independent) is the key to the success of bottom-up
management. For example, propositions 1 and 2 imply that if a manager can commit to tough and
strict monitoring, the delegation of leadership will increase the subordinate’s productive eﬀort or
decrease fraudulent eﬀort.
However, propositions 3 and 4 imply that if a manager cannot commit to strict governance, the
delegation of leadership would decrease the subordinate’s productive eﬀort or increase fraudulent
eﬀort. In this case, the delegation of leadership, or bottom-up management, would not be optimal.
6.2 Authority and Endogenous Relationship
This paper also shows how the formal authority endogenously determines the relationship between
a principal (a player with authority) and an agent (a player without authority) in general. The
12The proof is omitted, but available from the author.
22relationship between the two players can be deﬁned by how the project/task of each player aﬀects
the other’s payoﬀs. For simplicity, let us deﬁne a project that reduces the other’s payoﬀs as a
‘negative’ project, and a project that increases the other’s payoﬀs as a ‘positive’ project.
If both players choose positive projects, we refer to such a relationship as ‘cooperation’. If both
players choose negative projects, we deﬁne such a relationship as ‘conﬂict’. Also, if the principal
chooses a positive project, and the agent chooses a negative project, we deﬁne such a relationship
as ‘corruption’. Finally, if the principal chooses a negative project, and the agent chooses a positive
project, we call such relationship as ‘governance’. Table I summarizes these diﬀerent types of
relationship.
Table I Types of Relationship
Agent
positive project negative project
Principal positive project cooperation corruption
negative project governance conﬂict
Proposition 7 shows that the relationship between the principal and the agent will be endoge-
nously determined by the ‘governance’ relationship, where the principal’s task is to reduce the
agent’s payoﬀs (e.g. monitoring and auditing), and the agent’s task is to increase the principal’s
payoﬀs (e.g. production). Such asymmetry in tasks within hierarchical relationships is universal
even in modern organizations as evident in terms like ‘manager’ and ‘worker’.
Note that there is no intrinsic asymmetry between the board (the principal) and the CEO (the
agent) in our model, except that the board has the formal authority, or the decision right to choose
among alternatives. Therefore, this paper shows that the formal authority alone can endogenously
lead to the governance relationship between the principal and the agent.
This result may seem obvious. If the principal must trade-oﬀ between her own payoﬀ and the
agent’s payoﬀ, the principal, with her formal authority, would choose to reduce the agent’s payoﬀs.
Also, if the principal can overturn the agent’s negative project, or ﬁre the agent, the agent would
have no choice but to work to increase the principal’s payoﬀs.
23However, it is worth emphasizing that the endogenous relationship in our model arises for a
strategic reason. From (1) and (2), the board’s choice of independence (v) and the CEO’s choice
of project type (π) have no direct eﬀect on their own payoﬀs. Also, we have assumed that the
principal does not have veto power, and cannot ﬁre the agent. Thus, the endogenous choice of v
and π is the only way to aﬀect the other’s behavior. In this sense, this paper uncovers the strategic
reason for the governance relationship in hierarchical organizations.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the strategic incentive to separate the titles of CEO and Chairman of the Board.
If the board is not independent enough to discipline a CEO, it is optimal for the board to take
the leadership by separating the titles. However, the board (or shareholders) is better-oﬀ if it can
increase its independence without separating the titles. These results do not change even if the
separation of the titles leads to no-leadership or if leadership structure is jointly decided by both
the board and a CEO. Therefore, our results explain why most US ﬁrms do not separate the titles
despite the growing concerns for potential CEO frauds.
In general, this paper shows when it is optimal to delegate leadership, and how formal authority
determines the strategic relationship between a supervisor and a subordinate. Common governance
relationship where the supervisor is engaged in monitoring and auditing, while the subordinate
works for the supervisor is shown as an equilibrium outcome.
As far as we know, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to analyze separation of the titles, delega-
tion of leadership, and endogenous hierarchical relationship. But there are many extensions to
be considered in future research. For example, incorporating the agency problem of the board
or performance-based wage contracts should provide richer insights on the corporate governance
structure.
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26Appendix Proof of Propositions
For the proof of propositions 1 to 4, we ﬁrst establish the following lemmas, which also formalize
some of the intuitions we discussed in the text.
Lemma 1 aBL
B > aNL
B if and only if π < 0.
Proof For simpliﬁcation, denote board leadership (i.e. the split of the titles) by BL, CEO
leadership (i.e. CEO-chairman) by CL, and no-leadership by NL. From (1) and (4), if the board
takes the leadership, the equilibrium eﬀort levels of the board and the CEO (denoted by aBL
B and
aBL










Since k > 2, from (5) and (A.1) it is straightforward to show that aBL
B > aNL




C if and only if π(v − aNL
C ) < 0.
Proof From (2) and (3), if the CEO takes the leadership, the equilibrium eﬀort levels of the
board and the CEO (denoted by aCL
B and aCL
C ) are as follows:
aCL
B =




k − 1 − vπ
k2 − 2π
(A.2)
Then, from (5) and (A2) it is straightforward to show aCL
C > aNL
C if and only if π(v−aNL
C ) < 0.￿
From (1) and (2), denote the expected utility of the board and the CEO at board leadership
equilibrium by EUBL
B and EUBL
C respectively, those at CEO leadership equilibrium by EUCL
B and
EUCL
C , and those at no-leadership equilibrium by EUNL
B and EUNL
C .
Also, let us denote the board’s preference of leadership structure by ￿B .
Lemma 3 BL ￿B NL.
Proof Obvious from revealed preference.
Lemma 4 If v < aNL
C , then CL ￿B NL.
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= sign(−vπ2(k2 − π) +
￿
2k4 − 4k2π + π2￿
(k − 1))
= sign((2k4 − 4k2π + π2)aNL
C − v)
Since v < aNL
C = k−1
k2−π and k > 2, EUCL
B > EUNL
B or CL ￿B NL.￿
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Thus, given v < aNL










Lemma 6 0 < θ < aNL
C .
Proof Note that θ > 0 since
￿
k2 − π











The inequality is from our assumption that k > 2 and |π| < 1.￿
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose that v < aNL
C and π < 0.
(i) If v ≤ θ, from lemmas 3, 4 and 5, CL ￿B BL ￿B NL. Thus, CEO leadership is optimal.
Also, from lemma 6 and 2, CEO leadership in this case will be passive.
(ii) If θ < v(< aNL
C ), from lemmas 3, 4, and 5, BL ￿B CL ￿B NL. Thus, board leadership is
optimal. Also from lemma 6 and 1, board leadership in this case will be active.
(iii) From lemmas 3, 4, and 5, no-leadership is always the worst outcome for the board.￿
Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose that v < aNL
C and π > 0.
(i) If v ≤ θ, from lemmas 3, 4 and 5, CL ￿B BL ￿B NL. Thus, CEO leadership is optimal.
Also, from lemma 6 and 2, CEO leadership in this case will be active.
28(ii) If θ < v(< aNL
C ), from lemmas 3, 4, and 5, BL ￿B CL ￿B NL. Thus, board leadership is
optimal. Also from lemma 6 and 1, board leadership in this case will be passive.
(iii) From lemmas 3, 4, and 5, no-leadership is always the worst outcome for the board.￿
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose that v > aNL
C and π > 0.
Since aNL
C > θ, from lemmas 3, 4, and 5, BL ￿B NL ￿B CL. Therefore, board leadership is
optimal. Also, from lemma 1, board leadership in this case will be passive. Also, no-leadership is
better for the board than CEO-leadership.￿
Proof of Proposition 4 Suppose that v > aNL
C and π < 0.
Since aNL
C > θ, from lemmas 3, 4, and 5, BL ￿B NL ￿B CL. Therefore, board leadership is
optimal. Also, from lemma 1, board leadership in this case will be active. Also, no-leadership is
better for the board than CEO-leadership.￿
Proof of Proposition 5
Claim 1 Suppose that v ≥ θ. If v ≥ η, then it is optimal for the CEO to choose π = π. If
v < η, then it is optimal for the CEO to choose π = π, where η ≡
(k−1)(k2−π−π)
(k2−2π)(k2−2π).
Since v > θ, from propositions 1 and 2, board leadership is optimal.














∂π > 0 iﬀ π > 1
2v
￿
k2v − k + 1
￿
.
Suppose that v ≥
(k−1)
k2−2 . Then, it is straightforward to show that 1
2v
￿
k2v − k + 1
￿
≥ 1. Since
π < 1, EUBL
C must be strictly decreasing over [π,π]. Therefore, the CEO must choose π = π to
maximize the expected utility.
Now suppose that v <
(k−1)
k2−2 . Then, we can show that 1
2v
￿
k2v − k + 1
￿
< 1. Thus, the CEO’s ex-
pected utility is maximized either at π = π or π = π. In particular, we can show that EUBL
C (π;k,v)−
EUBL





k2−2 , if v > η, it is optimal for the CEO to choose π = π. However, if v < η, then it
is optimal for the CEO to choose π = π.
Claim 2 Suppose that v < θ. Then it is always optimal for the CEO to choose π = π.
29Since v < θ, from proposition 1 and 2, CEO-leadership is optimal.
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￿
)(vπ − k + 1)
Note that
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(k2 − π)v − (k − 1
￿




If v < 0, then,
∂EUCL
C (π;k,v)




v < −1 < π, the CEO’s expected utility
must be increasing over [π,π]. Therefore, the CEO must choose π = π to maximize the expected
utility.
If v > 0, then,
∂EUCL
C (π;k,v)
∂π < 0 iﬀ π >
(k−1)
v . Since π < 1 <
(k−1)
v ,the CEO’s expected
utility must be increasing over [π,π]. Therefore, the CEO still must choose π = π to maximize the
expected utility.
Claim 3 Deﬁne γ = max{η,θ}. Then, θ ≤ γ < aBL+
C












Then, the proof of the proposition directly follows from these claims.￿
Proof of Proposition 6 Suppose that v ≥ θ. Then, board-leadership is optimal. From (A.1),
the choice of eﬀorts do not depend on v under board-leadership. Thus, the board is indiﬀerent with
respect to v.













∂v < 0 iﬀ v <
(k2−π)(k−1)
π . It is straightforward to show that
(k2−π)(k−1)
π > θ.
Therefore, when v < θ, under CEO-leadership, the board’s payoﬀ decreases in v. Therefore, it is
optimal for the board to choose v = v.￿








((k2π − 2π2)v (A.3)
+(2k3 − 2k2 − 4kπ + 4π)v + 2k2 − 4k + 2)
If π < 0, then EUCL
C − EUBL
C > 0 if and only if




















Since k > 2 and π < 0, γ￿ > 0,it is also straightforward to show that γ < aNL
C .







2 (k2 − 2π)
× (A.4)
￿
(2k4 − 6k2π + 4π2)v − (2k3 − 2k2 − 3kπ + 3π)
￿
Since k > 2 and π < 0, EUNL
C − EUBL
C > 0 if and only if





It is also straightforward but tedious to show that φ < γ and that θ < φ < γ < aNL
C < γ￿.
Finally, from the revealed preference argument, EUCL
C > EUNL
C . Proposition 8 summarizes
these results.￿
Proof of Proposition 9 Suppose that π > 0. From (A.3), if π > 0, then EUCL
C −EUBL
C > 0
if and only if v > γ or v < γ￿. Also from (A.4), EUNL
C − EUBL
C > 0 if and only if v > φ. When
π > 0, it is also straightforward to show that γ￿ < 0 < θ < aNL
C < γ < φ. Again, from the revealed
preference argument, EUCL
C > EUNL
C . Proposition 9 summarizes these results.￿
Proof of Proposition 12 First, consider the board’s choice of v. Suppose that π < 0. From
proposition 10, if v > γ, board leadership will satisfy both the board and the CEO. And if v < φ,
31CEO leadership will satisfy both. However, if φ < v < γ, board leadership does not pareto-dominate
CEO leadership, and vice versa. In this case, since γ < aNL
C , the board is independent. Then, we
have assumed that the board can choose the leadership structure. Since θ < φ, from proposition 1,
the board will prefer board leadership to CEO leadership. To summarize, to satisfy both the board
and the CEO, if v > φ, board leadership will be chosen. If v < φ, CEO leadership will be chosen.
Then, from the proof of proposition 6, the board’s payoﬀ is maximized at v = v.
Now suppose that π > 0. From proposition 11, if v > φ, there will be no-leadership. If θ < v < φ,
board leadership will be chosen. If γ￿ < v < θ, from proposition 1, the board is independent, and it
will choose the CEO-leadership under our assumption. Finally, if v < γ￿, the CEO-leadership will
be chosen. Note that from (5), the board’s payoﬀs do not depend on v under no-leadership. Also,
from (A.1), the board’s payoﬀs do not depend on v under board-leadership, either. However, from
the proof of proposition 6, the board’s payoﬀs decreases in v under CEO-leadership. Therefore, the
board’s payoﬀs must be maximized at v = v.
Then, regardless of π, the dominant strategy for the board is to choose v = v.
Now, consider the agent’s choice of π. Given that the board will always choose the minimum
v = v(< θ), from the discussion above, the CEO-leadership will be chosen regardless of π. Then,
from Claim 2 in the proof of proposition 5, the CEO’s payoﬀs is maximized at π = π.
Therefore, the equilibrium in proposition 7 does not change even if the leadership structure
must satisfy both the board and the CEO.￿










Figure 2  Board vs. CEO Preference: π<0 
 
Note:  ‘CL’,  ‘BL’,  and  ‘NL’  stand  for  CEO-leadership,  Board-leadership,  and  No-leadership, 
respectively. The board’s preference is based on proposition 1 and 4. The CEO’s preference is 
based on proposition 8. The grey box area represents the range of ‘v’ where both the board and 
the CEO agree on the optimal leadership structure. 
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Figure 3  Board vs. CEO Preference: π>0 
 
 
Note:  ‘CL’,  ‘BL’,  and  ‘NL’  stand  for  CEO-leadership,  Board-leadership,  and  No-leadership, 
respectively. The board’s preference is based on proposition 2 and 3. The CEO’s preference is 
based on proposition 9. The grey box area represents the range of ‘v’ where both the board and 
the CEO agree on the optimal leadership structure. 
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